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Abstract
We investigate the determinants of teacher exits from and mobility
within the Queensland state school system. In common with previous
research we nd that non-pecuniary factors, such as class size and loca-
tion, a¤ect movement decisions but our results suggest a signicant role
for pecuniary factors. In particular, higher wages reduce exits from the
public sector, especially in the case of more experienced female teachers.
Locality allowances paid to teachers in rural and remote schools, where
non-pecuniary factors are less attractive, appear to have some success in
attracting and retaining sta¤ in these locations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Understanding how the teacher labour market operates is of crucial importance
if e¤ective policies aimed at the recruitment, training and retention of teachers
are to be designed. It is often claimed that teachers in the public sector exhibit
high levels of turnover1 , therefore most of the previous research on teacher
labour markets has focused on the factors that determine the decision to leave
the public school system (Murnane and Olsen 1989, Dolton 1990, Dolton and
van der Klaauw 1995, Stinebrickner 2002, Bonesronning et al. 2003, Hanushek
et al 2004). However, variations in teacher quality across public schools, and
the impact this has on teacher e¤ectiveness and the human capital acquisition
of pupils, is also a major point of concern in a number of countries, such as the
UK (Chevalier and Dolton 2004), the US (Hanushek et al 2004) and Australia.
In spite of this concern, there has been relatively little research on teacher
mobility within the school sector. Exceptions are Bonesronning et al. (2003)
and Falch and Strom (2004), who both treat the turnover and mobility decisions
separately. As Hanushek et al (2004) argue, however, a proper understanding
of how the teacher labour market operates requires a simultaneous analysis of
teacher turnover and mobility decisions as they are part of the same decision
making process.
Most of the previous research on teacher turnover has also focused predomi-
nantly on early career decisions using a variety of cohort datasets (Murnane and
1Although Harris and Adams (2006) demonstrate that teacher turnover is not noticeably
higher than in other professions.
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Olsen 1989, Dolton and van der Klaauw 1995, Gritz and Theobold 1996, Mont
and Rees 1996, Stinebrickner 1998, Stinebrickner 2002), where the emphasis has
been on the e¤ect of relative wages. These studies su¤er from the absence of
adequate controls for other working conditions, which may be correlated with
wages. Moreover, although the relative wage has been shown to have some e¤ect
on teacher turnover, it has also been shown that both mobility within the public
school system, and exits from that system, appear to be largely related to work-
ing conditions, or non-pecuniary factors (Bonesronning et al. 2003, Hanushek
et al 2004, Falch and Strom 2004). Specically, there is evidence that teachers
sort between schools and the better qualied teachers move to better schools,
as dened by student and sta¤ composition and performance (Bonesronning et
al. 2003, Clotfelter et al. 2004). It is clearly important from a policy perspective
to know if pecuniary or non-pecuniary factors are more important determinants
of teacher turnover and mobility, since this information can help in the design of
compensation and human resource management policies to mitigate the worst
e¤ects of turnover and mobility.
In this paper we address three issues. First, we provide new evidence on the
impact of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors on teacher turnover and teacher
mobility within the Queensland public school system. Our dataset refers to
the population of teachers, which is mapped to student data, so giving a rich
description of the the characteristics of students, working conditions, teacher
composition and pay. Importantly, and unlike some previous research, such as
Hanushek et al (2004), we focus on the characteristics of schools rather than
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school districts, and we are able to distinguish between teachers on temporary
contracts from those on permanent contracts. Second, and following the work
of Hanushek et al (2004), we examine how the e¤ects of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary factors vary over the career, or life cycle, of teachers. Third, we
investigate the e¤ect of a labour subsidy, or locality allowance, on the mobility
decisions of teachers, and in particular whether this subsidy serves the purpose
for which it was designed, namely to encourage teachers to move to, and remain
in, schools in rural and remote areas. This is particularly important in the
Queensland context, because of the large geographical concentrations of Abo-
riginal and Torres Strait islander (ATSI) populations in the remote and rural
areas of the state.
The analysis is conducted separately for males and females because they face
di¤erent career decisions and may therefore respond di¤erently to the pecuniary
and non-pecuniary e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides the
institutional background on the Queensland state school system and an overview
of the data source. Section 3 outlines the model and empirical methodology
used in this study, and section 4 discusses the results. This is followed by our
conclusions.
2 DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
This study uses a number of di¤erent data sources to construct a matched
teacher-school database. First, we use personnel data from Education Queens-
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lands human resource information system collected quarterly for the period
2001 to 2002. This covers all teachers employed in the Queensland state school
system sector for Queensland.2 For each teacher we have a record of their
age, gender, educational qualications, ethnic background (e.g. ATSI or non-
english speaking background, NESB), tenure in the state teacher service, dis-
ability status, teachers specialism, educational level and their wage. We predict
each teachers outside wage using 2001 Census data. Additionally, our database
records whether a teacher separated during this period. The longitudinal nature
of the data means that it is possible to observe inter-school movements, both
within and between school districts. Finally, the school at which the teacher
was working is included, and along with occupational codes this allows us to
distinguish between primary and secondary school teachers.
Queensland teachers can be employed under three di¤erent types of contracts
- casual, temporary or permanent. Casual teachers are generally short term
contract sta¤ and used as relief teachers who are not necessarily attached
to a school in the standard manner, and who may enter and leave the teaching
workforce on a regular basis. As a result we exclude this group from our analysis.
In common with other forms of tenured position in the public sector, permanent
teachers are very di¢ cult to dismiss, and dismissal generally only occurs in cases
of misconduct. As a result almost all exits from the teaching labour force by
2The Australian school system is split into three sectors, government administered, inde-
pendent private schools, and schools run by the catholic school board. As at 2000, 69 per
cent of Australian students attended government schools, the others attend Catholic or Inde-
pendent schools (Le and Miller 2003). A slightly higher proportion of Queensland students
attend government schools.
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teachers on permanent contracts are quits. Conversely, exits by teachers on
temporary contracts are almost exclusively due to dismissal or non-renewal of
contract. Finally, we explicitly observe exits from teaching due to retirement.
These exits are not analysed, and teaching spells that end through retirement
are right censored at that point.
Second, we utilise data drawn from Education Queensland school adminis-
trative database to provide information on teachers workplaces. Specically, we
utilise student record data that covers all students in the Queensland state school
system for 2001. One important aspect of our pupil database is that it contains
information on student test score performance, which is used to construct mea-
sures of student quality. Queensland school students conduct standardized tests
at year 3, year 5, year 7 and year 12 (the nal year of school). For primary school
students we use literacy scores for year seven (the nal year of primary school-
ing), scaled to a national mean of 700, which is regarded as a measure of pupil
quality. In fact, Queensland primary school literacy performance is below this
benchmark. This is partly a reection of the higher proportion of indigenous
Australians in the state (Bradley et al. 2006). For secondary schools, year 12
test scores will not necessarily be an accurate representation of overall student
quality or performance at the school. This is because: (a) poorer quality or
less motivated students are likely to leave the school after the end of compul-
sory schooling (year 10); and (b) some students may choose to move to schools
that are more successful to complete high school. To allow for this we utilise
secondary school retention data covering the proportion of students who began
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at the school in year 8 that also completed at the same school in year 12. We
would expect that tenured teachers at poorly performing schools would be more
likely to exit from the sector or move to another school.
Queensland covers a large area of land, and geographically remote areas
generally have higher concentrations of indigenous Australians3 and these peo-
ple are, in socioeconomic terms, amongst the most disadvantaged of indigenous
Australians. Other schools are in regional centres and there is an urban concen-
tration of population in south east Queensland centred around the state capital
of Brisbane. As we have the postcode of each school, we can identify urban,
rural and remote schools. This data also allows us to include local labour market
information such as the unemployment rate in the schools area.4
INSERT TABLE 1 & 2
Tables 1 and 2 reports summary statistics of teacher characteristics disag-
gregated by type of contract, and by whether they remained in the school,
moved to another school or exited from the public school system during 2001-
2002. Women dominate the teaching profession, especially at the primary school
level. Temporary teachers have substantially lower tenure and wage rates than
permanent teachers, and are more likely to be part-time. The majority of teach-
ers hold a degree, although a substantial fraction of (primary) teachers have a
teaching diploma. In contrast, a small, but not insubstantial fraction of male
teachers possess a higher degree. Male teachers are also over-represented in
3Overall, Queensland has the highest concentration of indigenous Australians among Aus-
tralian States (gures). Only the (relatively small) Northern Territory has a higher proportion.
4Specically, we use data drawn from DEWRSBs local area labour market dataset.
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Science and Engineering subjects, which are typically shortage areas. What is
also of note is that male teachers tend to work in larger schools with slightly
smaller average class sizes. There are few di¤erences between male and female
teachers with respect to pupil composition, or between temporary and perma-
nent teachers, except in the case of rural schools where a higher proportion of
permanent teachers are located.
In Table 3 we compute average annual transition rates over the period sub-
divided by tenure, or levels of experience. The motivation for this disaggregation
follows Hanushek et al (2004) who rightly argue that the e¤ect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary factors on teacher turnover and mobility decisions is likely to
vary with experience. Family commitments, for instance, are more likely to
constrain the mobility decisions of older, more experienced, teachers, whereas
less experienced teachers are likely to be lower down the job hierarchy and
therefore are more likely to move to seek a promotion and higher wages. It
should also be borne in mind when reading Table 3 that the 0-2 and 2-5 year
categories include the majority of workers on temporary contracts. What Table
3 suggests is that, less experienced teachers are more likely to move school and
move district, suggesting that they are highly mobile. In fact, mobility falls
more or less monotonically with the level of experience, which is consistent with
a job matching process in which teachers and schools learn about each other and
form long term matches or alternatively dissolve unsatisfactory matches. What
is also interesting is that the magnitude of teacher mobility exceeds that of
teacher turnover, reinforcing the justication for our analysis. Of those workers
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who do exit the school system, involuntary separations are more likely. At rst
glance, this would appear to be a new nding, contrasting sharply with the view
expressed in Hanushek et al (2004) that most turnover is voluntary. However,
we know that most of this involuntary turnover is actually attributable to those
teachers on temporary contracts being unable to nd a suitable job match in
the profession. In fact, for more experienced teachers, voluntary turnover does
exceed involuntary turnover.
INSERT TABLE 3
In view of the high levels of mobility observed in Table 3, and given the
geography of Queensland, Table 4 analyses the origin and destination of movers.
For all teachers, the majority of movers, as expected, are from schools in urban
areas (4,217) and represent 12% of all teachers in urban areas. However, these
teachers overwhelmingly move to schools that are also in urban areas (84%),
with only 7% being encouraged to move to the remote areas of Queensland.
Similarly, there is substantial ight by teachers from rural and remote schools
to schools in urban areas, which may be a reection of higher pay, better working
conditions or simply more job vacancies. Consequently, schools in remote and
rural areas exhibit higher levels of teacher turnover, which is likely to impact
adversely on pupil attainment. What is also apparent from Table 4 is that
teachers with less experience and those on temporary contracts (see the lower
panel) behave in more or less the same way as the average teacher.
INSERT TABLE 4
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3 MODEL AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 A Model of Teacher Turnover and Mobility
We adopt the theoretical and methodological framework proposed by Hanushek
et al (2004). They note that teacher decisions to move schools are often based
on compensating variations related to improvements in non-pecuniary benets
such as better working conditions and environment rather than wage increases.
These benets are set against the costs of movement that comprise of direct
expenditure and psychic costs. The size of these benets and costs are likely
to be proportional to distance. For instance, a teacher contemplating an intra-
school district move is unlikely to incur the costs associated with a change
of residence and social circumstances, whereas inter-school district moves may
incur these costs. Our theoretical model tries to explicitly capture this aspect
of the decision process.
A teacher, i, located in school s searches the available set of alternative
schools, s, and in so doing seeks to maximise the present value of expected
discounted utility, as follows
max
s





cs = c(Zi; Lj s)
where Xs are the characteristics, or non-pecuniary features, of the school, s,
Wi is a vector of variables reecting pecuniary factors, or teacher remuneration,
including the predicted outside wage and locality allowance, Zi captures the
personal characteristics of the teacher and L refers to the location of the school.
fsgi refers to the feasible set of alternative schools available to teacher i, and cs
represent the costs of moving from school s to school s. These pecuniary and
non-pecuniary costs are expected to vary with the distance of the move, so that
the costs of moving within the same school district are likely to be less than those
associated with moves between schools and districts. If s > 0 then a teacher
may move to an alternative school if the present value of expected discounted
utiltity of s is greater than that from staying in s as well as considering outside
opportunities.: If s = 0 then a teacher will consider only opportunities outside of
the public school sector, and will exit the system if the present value of expected
discounted utility of doing so is greater than that from remaining in school s.
Job matching is a stochastic process, and it is therefore possible to imagine
that teachers will update their valuations of the alternative options over time,
hence leading to the observation that at any particular time, t, a teacher, i,
can be observed in one of three states: a non-searcher or stayer (j = 1), an
exiter from the school sector (j = 2) or a mover (j = 3). This represents the
dependent variable, y, which is modelled as a function of the vectors of variables
listed above in Equation (1).5
5We observe teacher mobility within and between districts, however, there are too few
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= x(j   0); j = 1; :::; 3
(2)
where j indexes the three states referred to above. Pj is the probability of
observing a teacher in the jth state with characteritics x, which incorporates
all of the e¤ects listed in Equation (1). The maximum likelihood estimates of
the j are di¢ cult to interpret, and so we adopt standard practice and report
marginal e¤ects.
In terms of the covariates in the model, there are several variables in our data
that reect the characteristics of the school, Xs, including those relating to the
quality of the student body, the teachers peer group and those referring to the
school itself. Since we do not estimate separate models for primary teachers and
secondary teachers, we include a dummy variable for primary school teachers.
This variable can be thought of as another proxy for the working conditions
that the teacher faces insofar as younger pupils are typically easier to teach
than teenagers. Moreover, primary school teachers would in general have less
outside options as they have more sector specic human capital. Primary school
teachers may therefore be less likely to exit the sector. Given that we are
only able to measure the schools average literacy score for primary pupils and
observations to allow us to disaggregate these movements in our modelling.
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the schools average retention rate for secondary pupils, our measures of the
quality of the student body are constructed as follows. Each school is ranked on
either of the two measures and its position in the inter-quartile range identied.
Primary schools in the top quartile with respect to literacy scores and secondary
schools in the top quartile with respect to retention rates are denoted high
perfoming schools; schools in the bottom quartile are low performing schools.
It is expected that teachers in high performing schools will be less likely to exit
the sector and also less likely to move from that school. We also include the
average class size in the school, and it is expected that teachers get greater
utility from teaching smaller classes or simply see it as compensation for low
wages. Irrespective of the reason, the expectation is that teachers in schools
with lower average class size are less likely to exit or move. School size is
entered as a separate variable and it is uncertain what e¤ect this variable will
have on the turnover and mobility decisions of teachers. Larger schools may
give the teacher the opportunity to specialise in their particular subject, rather
than teaching more than one subject. They may also have less administration
to perform because the school is more likely to be able to a¤ord support sta¤,
such as technicians, administrative and clerical workers. Moreover, there may
be more promotion opportunities within the school, which means that a teacher
may have a higher probability of moving up the career ladder in situ. For
these reasons we can therefore expect that larger schools are associated with
a lower exit rate from the public school system and less movement to other
schools. However, there is a downside to working in a large school, which is
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that some teachers may feel divorced from their pupils and the decision-making
processes in the school, leading to a feeling of alienation and demoralisation. If
this e¤ect outweighs the previous e¤ects, then teachers in bigger schools may
be more likely to exit the sector or simply move to another (smaller) school.
Finally, two measures of the teachers peer group are included in the model, the
proportion of female sta¤ in the school and the proportion of sta¤with a degree
or higher degree. These variables capture teacher preferences for working in
particular types of teams. Alternative opportunities, fsg, are partly picked up
by including a control for the number of private sector schools in the education
district in which the teacher works, and by the local unemployment rate.
Pecuniary factors, Wi; are captured by the teachers own wage WS and
whether they receive an allowance for working in a geographically remote or
rural school. Locality allowances were introduced by the Queensland govern-
ment to induce teachers to move to schools in isolated areas, where teacher
recruitment and retention are di¢ cult. Higher wages, all else equal, should
encourage teachers to remain in the public school system and reduce the prob-
ability of movement. The receipt of a locality allowance should also have a
similar e¤ect. Clearly, teachers may also look beyond the teaching profession
for better paying opportunities in the private sector. To capture this e¤ect, we
compute the expected outside wage, W0, using census data.6 A higher expected
outside wage should lead to an increased probability of exit from the public
6We eschew the inclusion of the relative wage in our model (own wage divided by predicted
outside wage) since we wish to observe which of the two pecunairy factors have the strongest
e¤ect on teacher turnover and mobility. This is important from a policy perspective.
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school system, but should have no e¤ect on movement within the system.
In terms of policy making, the crucial issue is whether the magnitude of the
e¤ects of pecuniary factors outweigh those from the non-pecuniary factors.
A number of variables are included to capture di¤erences in teacher prefer-
ences, Zi, such as their highest educational qualication (i.e. higher degree, de-
gree or diploma), their eld of specialisation (science, arts, health or other), gen-
der and eithnic background (NESB by Asian, European and other, and ATSI).
Since we observe the postcode of every school, it is possible to determine its
geographical location which is then classied into urban, rural or remote areas7 .
Together, these variables capture the location e¤ects, L, referred to in equation
(1). It is expected that schools located in rural and remote schools will have
fewer amenities and services and hence be perceived by teachers as less desirable
locations in which to work. This is perhaps particularly true of remote schools.
Teachers from schools in remote and to a lesser extent rural schools are expected
to exhibit a higher risk of turnover and mobility.
7We eschew the distinction between intra and inter district moves in thie paper as the




4.1 The e¤ect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors on
teacher turnover and mobility
Tables 5 to 7 report estimated marginal e¤ects from multinomial logit models,
where Tables 5 and 6 refer to female and male teachers on permanent contracts,
respectively, and Table 7 refers to all temporary workers. It is important to
note that the majority of teachers on temporary contracts are actually female.
In terms of pecuniary e¤ects (Wi), we nd that the higher the predicted
outside wage the greater the risk of teacher turnover amongst males but there
is no e¤ect for females or those teachers on temporary contracts. The e¤ect
of the predicted outside wages on teacher mobility is negative and statistically
signicant for female teachers on permanent contracts, which is what one would
expect insofar as the bulk of these teachers have taken a career decision to
teach and also to remain in the public schooling system and those with greater
potential earning power may be in more senior positions. The higher the wage
paid to permanent teachers, the lower the risk of turnover and this e¤ect is
slightly greater for male teachers. The wage elasticities, evaluated at the overall
sample means, are quite small but still larger than many of the elasticities for
the non-pecuniary factors, and range from -0.04 for female movers to -0.08 for
male teachers who exit the public school system. These nding are important
because they suggest that, government can increase teacher wages as a means of
reducing the outow from the public school system, but the increases would have
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to be quite large to see any sizeable response. The remaining pecuniary e¤ect
arises from the payment of an additional locality allowancefor teachers who
work in, or move to, schools in rural and remote areas. These allowances appear
to have the desired e¤ect insofar as they reduce teacher turnover but encourage
teacher mobility, although the latter e¤ect is not large and only applies to female
permanent teachers. It is also interesting to note that the locality allowance has
a greater e¤ect on female teachers, which is reected by the size of the marginal
e¤ects. Furthermore, the largest e¤ect is observed for temporary teachers, who
are mainly females, with respect to teacher turnover where the marginal e¤ect
is -0.09.
INSERT TABLES 5, 6 AND 7
In terms of non-pecuniary e¤ects (Xs), the quality of the student body is
captured by the performance of the pupils. There is a small positive marginal
e¤ect of being in a school with low pupil performance on teacher turnover and
mobility in the case of male teachers on permanent contracts (Table 5), and a
similar e¤ect on teacher mobility for female teachers on permanent contracts
(Table 6). The estimates convert to elasticities that are much bigger than those
for wages: for females these are 0.44 for exiters and 1.4 for movers, and the
equivalent gures for males are 1.66 and 0.89. Thus, females respond to a poorer
student body by moving whereas males tend to quit the public school system.
What is more, these are large e¤ects. The e¤ect of working in a school with high
perfoming students typically reduces teacher turnover and mobility but these
e¤ects are small and statistically insignicant in all models. The e¤ects of school
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size and average class size are interesting insofar as they have equal and opposite
e¤ects with respect to teacher mobility. Thus, teachers are less likely to move
from larger schools for reasons cited in the previous section. Conversely, teaching
larger classes increases the risk of a teacher moving school, perhaps because they
prefer smaller classes or because a smaller class is seen as compensation for lower
wages (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 2004). These e¤ects are slightly larger for
male teachers, and interestingly they are also observed for teachers on temporary
contracts. However, note that the e¤ects of school size and average class size are
estimated in log points, which means that their absolute magnitudes are quite
small when compared to the e¤ects of the pecuniary factors discussed earlier.
There are also sectoral di¤erences in the risk of teacher turnover, insofar as
primary school teachers are less likely to leave the profession, whereas there is
no di¤erence between primary and secondary school teachers with respect to
mobility. The estimates for exits from the school system convert to elasticities
of -1.58 and -2.89 for females and males, respectively. Furthermore, the e¤ect of
primary school status is seven times stronger for temporary teachers - compare
the marginal e¤ect of -0.07 with that for permanent teachers of around -0.01.
The primary school environment may be regarded as compensation for the un-
certain nature of the temporary teachers contract. However, by far the largest
non-pecuniary e¤ect arises from part time contract status. Permanent teachers
on this type of contract are more likely to exit the profession and almost twice
as likely to move schools, especially in the case of males. The elasticities for each
outcome and for each gender are around 2.6, the exception being male teachers
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who move where the estimated elasticity is 5.25. Note, however, that there are
only 8% of male teachers on permanent part time contracts. Nevertheless, these
results imply that male and female teachers on these types of contracts either
become disenchanted with their status as part timers and leave for full time
contracts outside the teaching profession or inside the profession but at another
school. Of course, the other possibility is that teachers on part time contracts
are more mobile and simply move to other part time teaching jobs. Teachers on
part time temporary contracts behave di¤erently to permanent workers, insofar
as they are less likely to move schools but they are more likely to leave the
public school system (Table 7). Our data shows that all male exiters on part
time temporary contracts were involuntary separations, whereas for females it
was 274 out of 279. There are also clear gender di¤erences in the reasons for
part time teachers to move. For male teachers on part time contracts, 45 per
cent move to take up full-time contracts, whereas the corresponding gure for
females was 35 per cent. It is also worth noting in passing that a higher local
unemployment rate, which reects the availability of job opportunities in both
the private sector and teaching profession, impedes permanent teacher mobility,
especially in the case of male teachers.
An interim conclusion that arises from a comparison of the magnitudes of
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary e¤ects is that, unlike many other studies, we
nd that the pecuniary e¤ects are important. The e¤ect of the own wage is
particularly strong, even though the elasticity is low, suggesting that teacher
compensation policies can have an e¤ect on teacher turnover and teacher mo-
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bility. However, teachers are very responsive to non-pecuniary characteristics,
especially in terms of the low quality of the student body, the sector in which
they work and their contract status. Before we explore how the e¤ects of pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary e¤ects vary over teachers careers, it is worth briey
discussing the e¤ects of location, L, and the personal characteristics of the
teachers, Zi.
The geographical location of the school has a mixed e¤ect on teacher turnover
and teacher mobility. Female teachers on permanent contracts and temporary
teachers in remote schools are more likely to leave the public school system,
when compared to their counterparts in urban schools, especially in the case
of temporary teachers (see the large marginal e¤ect of 0.10 in table 6). For
female teachers on permanent contracts, the estimates convert to elasticities
of 3.57 for those who quit the profession and 1.48 for those who move school,
again suggesting that these teachers are highly responsive to poorer amenities
in remote localities. Female teachers on permanent contracts in schools in rural
areas are also more likely to leave the public school system but this e¤ect is
smaller than for those in remote schools. Similar e¤ects are observed with
respect to the decision to move schools. Here there is clear evidence of higher
teacher mobility in schools in more isolated geographical areas, and this time
the e¤ect is larger for male teachers on permanent contracts (marginal e¤ect =
0.05) than female teachers on permanent contracts (0.03). This is a worrying
nding, in that it may impact on the quality of education in these schools,
which tend to be comprised of mainly ATSI pupils. The results do not indicate
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whether this is teacher ightfrom these schools to urban areas, this is an issue
we address later.
A further interim conclusion from our analysis is that, whilst locality al-
lowances reduce the risk of teachers exiting the public school system, they do
not completely overcome the disincentives of working in schools in remote ge-
ographical areas. Moreover, whilst these allowances might initially encourage
teachers to move to schools in remote parts of Queensland, they do not appear
to have as big an e¤ect in ensuring that teachers are retained in these schools.
We explore the issue of teacher ight from rural and remote schools in more
detail below. Note again, however, that the e¤ects of location are not large
in comparison to the pecuniary e¤ects but they are bigger than most of the
non-pecuniary e¤ects, except for part time contract status.
Finally, turning to teacher preferences, reected by their characteristics,
there are some systematic e¤ects with respect to the educational backgrounds of
teachers. Teachers with a higher degree are more likely to move between schools,
in fact they are twice as likely to move schools when compared to teachers with
a degree (the marginal e¤ects are 0.12 and and 0.05 for female teachers, and
0.7 and 0.3 for male teachers). The elasticities for female teachers who move
range from 3.56 for those with a degree to 6.93 for those with a higher degree,
and the male equivalents are 2.37 and 4.44. These are large e¤ects and moves
may be to take up promoted positions. Male teachers on permanent contracts
with a diploma or better are slightly less likely to exit the public school system,
whereas temporary teachers with a higher degree have a much greater risk of
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exiting (marginal e¤ect = 0.21, Table 7). This presumably reects their greater
job opportunities in the private sector and the disincentive e¤ect of temporary
status. There are few systematic e¤ects with respect to the teachers eld of
specialisation or their ethnicity, although temporary teachers who are from a
non-English speaking background (NESB) are less likely to leave teaching but
they are more mobile than white Australian teachers.
4.2 Pecuniary and non-pecuniary e¤ects and teacher ca-
reers
In this section we explore how the e¤ects of pecuniary and non-pecuniary fac-
tors vary over the career, or life cycle, of permanent teachers, reected by the
work experience gained in the profession. Average work experience is highly
correlated with average age, so we can expect teachers with more work experi-
ence to be older. Tables 8 and 9 report the estimated marginal e¤ects obtained
from multinomial logit models that have been estimated separately for each
experience group.
INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9
There are virtually no statistically signicant e¤ects of the predicted outside
wage on teacher turnover, although as one might expect older and more expe-
rienced teachers are less responsive to higher outside wages than more junior
colleagues. In fact, the only positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of the
outside wage occurs for males with 0-2 years experience. There are no system-
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atic e¤ects of the outside wage on teacher mobility. The own wage is negative
and statistically signicant with respect to teacher turnover for female teachers,
especially for workers with between 5-20 years. These e¤ects are quite large
and suggest that higher wages do reduce the risk of the most experienced, and
presumably most valuable, female teachers from leaving the public school sys-
tem. Smaller e¤ects are observed for male teachers and these are statistically
insignicant. A higher own wage has a positive e¤ect on teacher mobility, but
this e¤ect is only statistically signicant for the least and the most experienced
female teachers. This result is counterintuitive, however, it is likely that the
wage is picking up unobserved teacher quality, such as motivation, which leads
to a higher risk of moving schools. There is a consistently negative and statis-
tically signicant e¤ect of the locality allowance on teacher turnover, especially
for females, implying that the payment of this additional allowance on top of
the wage reduces exits from the public school system. This e¤ect occurs for
all experience groups but is particularly strong for the two intermediate expe-
rience categories (2-5 and 5-10 years - see Table 8). The locality allowance has
a more muted e¤ect on male teacher turnover, and its e¤ect peters out for the
most experienced groups. The payment of a locality allowance also increases
the probability of a teacher moving school, especially for more junior teachers
with up to 10 years of teaching experience. Once again, the e¤ect of the locality
allowance is stronger for female teachers, which can be seen by comparing the
size of the marginal e¤ects and statistical signicance in Tables 8 and 9.
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Many of the non-pecuniary e¤ects have little, or no, e¤ect on male or fe-
male teacher turnover. The e¤ect of part time contract status is an exception,
which increases the risk of exit from the school system. Moreover, this e¤ect
is stronger for the less experienced and declines almost monotonically across
experience groups. This is most clearly observed for male teachers (Table 9)
where the marginal e¤ects are approximately 0.06 for the rst two experience
groups, declining to around 0.04 for the two intermediate groups and to 0.02 for
those teachers with over 20 years of experience. These results imply that less
experienced teachers do not prefer part time work and therefore choose to exit
the teaching profession.
There are some e¤ects of non-pecuniary factors on teacher mobility. This
is most evident for school size and average class size, which exhibit a similar
pattern to the pooled models discussed in the previous section. Teachers are
less likely to move from larger schools, and this e¤ect is roughly constant across
all experience groups up to 20 years and both genders, the exception being
male teachers with 2-5 years of experience where the e¤ect is particularly large
(marginal e¤ect = 0.12). The school size e¤ect declines a little for the most
experienced teachers. The larger the average size of the class the more likely it
is that teachers will move to another school. These e¤ects are stronger amongst
teachers at the early stages of their career, which is also the time when their wage
is likely to be at its lowest, reinforcing the compensating di¤erentials argument
discussed in the previous section.
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Female teachers working in a geographically remote school are more likely
to exit teaching or move to another school. This e¤ect is strongest for the least
experienced female teachers, and a similar pattern emerges for those teachers
in schools in rural areas. For male teachers the picture is very di¤erent with
few systematic e¤ects arising from working in a geographically remote school.
The only signicant e¤ect arises for the least experienced male teachers who are
more likely to move school.
In summary, there are di¤erences in the e¤ect of the pecuniary and non-
pecuniary factors over the career, or life cycle, of teachers, reecting the di¤er-
ent constraints on decision making. Nevertheless, it seems that female teacher
turnover is more sensitive to location, which could explain why their turnover
is more strongly inuenced by the locality allowance. By contrast, locality al-
lowances appear to encourage mobility amongst teachers with up to 10 years
experience. This may suggest that teachers are taking jobs with locality al-
lowances but then moving on to other posts. Hence, it is not clear that the
main policy objective is being achieved, we address this below.
4.3 Teacher ight and the e¤ect of locality allowances
So far we have shown that the payment of a locality allowance in addition to
the wage reduces the risk of teachers exiting the public school system, and it
increases teacher mobility. These e¤ects are particularly strong for the less
experienced teachers. However, what we cannot judge so far is whether the
allowance has the desired e¤ect of encouraging teachers to stay in schools in
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rural or remote areas, the latter being the prime focus of the policy. In this
section we therefore invesigate the direction of teacher movement, and focus
on the e¤ect of the locality allowance. We estimate a multinomial logit model
using only data for teachers who move schools, where the dependent variable is
as follows: j = 0 move schools within an urban area, j = 1 move to a school
in an urban area from a rural or remote location, j = 2 move to a school in a
rural area from amy location and j = 3 move to a school in a remote area from
any location. The base category is moved between two urban schools Dummy
variables capturing the origin area (rural and remote) are included alongside
the covariates from the previous models.
INSERT TABLES 10 AND 11
The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 10 and 11 and some
summary statistics are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. Ignoring the
e¤ect of the locality allowance for the moment, it is clear that teachers from
schools in rural or remote areas are more likely to move to schools in the same
area or same type of area. For instance, the marginal e¤ect on the remote school
variable for outcome j = 3 is 0.41, which is very large (see Table 10). The
equivalent gure for those female teachers originating in rural schools moving
to a school also in a rural area is 0.56. Similar e¤ects are observed for males,
although there is more evidence here that teachers are more likely to move to
schools in urban areas from remote schools. Excepting this latter nding, we
can conclude that of those teachers who move school, there is a high probability
that they will remain in the same kind of locality - rural or remote.
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Locality allowances have the e¤ect of increasing the probability of teachers
moving to schools in remote areas, but this e¤ect is only statistically signicant
in the case of female teachers. However, interacting the remote (origin) school
variable and locality allowance leads to a large positive and statistically signi-
cant e¤ect on the risk of male teachers moving to schools in rural areas (marginal
e¤ect 0.31) and a smaller positive e¤ect with respect to schools in remote areas
(marginal e¤ect 0.17). This suggests that the locality allowance has some e¤ect
in retaining male teachers in schools in remote areas, but also encourages them
to move from remote areas to rural areas. The insignicance of the interaction
term for female teachers would suggest that the locality allowance is attracting
teachers from outside remote areas to these schools.
In summary, it would appear that teachers who move schools are more like
to remain in the same kind of locality, and the results for the locality allowance
suggest that this policy has a positive e¤ect in this regard. Female teachers
are encouraged by the policy to move to schools remote areas, whereas male
teachers in schools in remote and rural areas are encouraged by the allowance
to remain in those localities. Clearly, our analysis of the e¤ect of the locality
allowance has been descriptive, and it would be incorrect to confuse correlation
with causation, however, there is su¢ cient in our results to imply some kind of
e¤ect from this policy intervention which warrants further investigation.
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5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the impact of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary factors on teacher turnover and teacher mobility within the Queens-
land public school system. Our dataset refers to the population of teachers,
which is mapped to student data, so giving a richer description of the the char-
acteristics of teachers, their working conditions and their pay. The main ndings
of this paper are as follows:
Pecuniary e¤ects appear to be important determinants of both teacher turnover
and teacher mobility, and the e¤ect of the teachers own wage is particularly
important. Higher pay reduces the risk of exit from teaching. However, teachers
working in geographically remote schools are more likely to exit teaching and
more likely to move school, and the latter is more likely to be a move back to
schools in urban areas where the local amenities are superior. For example,
our analysis of non-pecuniary factors highlighted how teachers prefer to work in
public schools that are larger and with a lower class size, these are both factors
that could work against rural and remote schools. Hence, the interest in the
e¤ects of the policy of paying locality allowances to teachers in rural and remote
locations. The payment of locality allowances on top of basic pay for teachers
who move to rural and remote schools reduces the likelihood of turnover, es-
pecially in the case of female teachers. In addition, the allowance appears to
encourge some movement of female teachers to remote and rural schools. Fe-
male teacherslocation decisions are more sensitive to location. Examination of
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary e¤ects over the life cycle of teachers revealed
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that locality allowances and wages play an important role for female teachers
in mid-career, who could be important to retain in the system. Moreover, there
is no evidence to suggest that the locality allowance is signicantly linked to
moves from rural and remote areas back to urban areas. Hence, the State gov-
ernment could possibly increase retention of sta¤ in these schools with further
supplements to these allowances.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Permanent Teachers
Male Female
Stayed Moved Exit Stayed Moved Exit
Predicted Outside Wage 3.024 2.981 2.987 2.769 2.768 2.750
Log Hourly Wage 3.320 3.291 3.282 3.255 3.240 3.229
Locality Allowance 0.267 0.475 0.188 0.213 0.285 0.086
Age 41.803 42.287 38.683 38.748 37.663 36.106
Tenure 16.091 10.716 10.670 11.765 8.906 8.300
NESB - Asian 0.018 0.25 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017
NESB - European 0.029 0.30 0.014 0.032 0.036 0.024
NESB - Other 0.068 0.068 0.070 0.068 0.067 0.052
Indigenous 0.010 0.018 0.012 0.009 0.006 0.004
Disability 0.097 0.075 0.087 0.060 0.047 0.057
Part-Time 0.054 0.149 0.253 0.204 0.289 0.376
Primary Teacher 0.443 0.579 0.366 0.685 0.741 0.610
Degree 0.489 0.511 0.427 0.481 0.499 0.451
Graduate Diploma 0.231 0.211 0.239 0.196 0.204 0.208
Higher Degree 0.047 0.063 0.048 0.031 0.042 0.026
Sciences & Engineering 0.133 0.109 0.161 0.038 0.038 0.031
Arts 0.079 0.076 0.108 0.093 0.089 0.131
Health 0.064 0.085 0.063 0.026 0.030 0.030
Other Specialisation 0.086 0.085 0.118 0.104 0.097 0.135
Log School Size 6.237 5.941 6.270 6.171 5.991 6.208
Log Class Size 2.200 2.215 2.155 2.321 2.307 2.288
High Performing School 0.283 0.230 0.251 0.285 0.249 0.276
Low Performing School 0.201 0.275 0.267 0.196 0.249 0.211
Non Govt Schools 1.261 1.186 1.051 1.302 1.282 1.387
Remote School 0.062 0.143 0.065 0.072 0.110 0.081
Rural School 0.146 0.191 0.149 0.147 0.181 0.159
Unemployment Rate 0.061 0.058 0.063 0.059 0.058 0.061
Proportion Teachers Female 0.682 0.712 0.664 0.734 0.744 0.718
Proportion Teachers Degree+ 0.739 0.734 0.744 0.717 0.715 0.730
Observations 7566 411 1176 19144 978 3269
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, Temporary Teachers
Stayed Moved Exit
Female 0.781 0.703 0.763
Predicted Outside Wage 2.756 2.816 3.086
Log Hourly Wage 3.100 3.102 3.086
Locality Allowance 0.156 0.072 0.091
Age 39.304 39.590 38.483
Tenure 3.041 3.222 2.643
NESB - Asian 0.034 0.019 0.043
NESB - European 0.040 0.031 0.052
NESB - Other 0.038 0.034 0.043
Indigenous 0.010 0.008 0.009
Disability 0.033 0.031 0.021
Part-Time 0.364 0.325 0.257
Primary Teacher 0.699 0.559 0.645
Degree 0.422 0.469 0.498
Graduate Diploma 0.154 0.196 0.177
Higher Degree 0.031 0.61 0.035
Sciences & Engineering 0.038 0.074 0.047
Arts 0.108 0.127 0.135
Health 0.050 0.046 0.050
Other Specialisation 0.110 0.150 0.139
Log School Size 6.133 6.217 6.177
Log Class Size 2.325 2.256 0.2334
High Performing School 0.308 0.320 0.295
Low Performing School 0.212 0.198 0.193
Non Govt Schools 1.221 1.187 1.094
Remote School 0.058 0.060 0.043
Rural School 0.116 0.105 0.126
Unemployment Rate 0.062 0.061 0.061
Proportion Teachers Female 0.739 0.709 0.729
Proportion Teachers Degree+ 0.713 0.733 0.719
Observations 1238 1115 654
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Table 3: Average Annual Transition Rates of Teachers by Tenure, 2001-20028
Remains at Change School Change Exit Schools Ave Number
Teacher Tenure Same School Within District District Voluntary Involuntary Retirement Teachers p.a.
0 to 2 years 0.73 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.00 8328
2 to 5 years 0.77 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.00 5284
5 to 10 years 0.82 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.00 4603
10 to 30 years 0.85 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01 13004
30+ years 0.87 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 3021
All 0.81 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01 32277
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Table 4: Origin and Destination of Teachers Moving District, 2001-20029
Number Changing Percentage of
All Teachers Urban Rural Remote District Origin Teachers
Urban 0.84 0.09 0.07 4217 0.12
Rural 0.41 0.50 0.09 1052 0.03
Remote 0.40 0.11 0.49 894 0.02
0 to 5 years Tenure
Urban 0.83 0.10 0.07 1710 0.14
Rural 0.37 0.54 0.09 532 0.04
Remote 0.39 0.10 0.51 519 0.04
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Table 5: The determinants of teacher turnover and teacher mobility - permanent
workers, females11
Variable Teacher turnover (j = 2) Teacher mobility (j = 3)
Marginal e¤ect s.e. Prob value Marginal e¤ect s.e. Prob value
Pecuniary e¤ects (Wi)
Predicted outside wage -0.003 0.010 0.801 -0.088 0.020 0.000
Own wage -0.052 0.008 0.000 -0.044 0.017 0.009
Locality allowance -0.041 0.005 0.000 0.016 0.004 0.003
Non-pecuniary e¤ects (Xi)
Part time 0.027 0.002 0.000 0.053 0.005 0.000
High student performance 0.000 0.003 0.981 -0.006 0.006 0.290
Low student performance 0.003 0.003 0.285 0.024 0.006 0.000
(ln)School size 0.003 0.002 0.219 -0.033 0.004 0.000
(ln)Average class size -0.003 0.003 0.225 0.031 0.005 0.000
%Female sta¤ -0.004 0.015 0.805 0.014 0.026 0.601
% of sta¤ with degree 0.014 0.013 0.284 0.031 0.022 0.168
No. of private schools 0.001 0.000 0.063 -0.001 0.001 0.205
Local unemployment rate 0.015 0.029 0.594 -0.099 0.059 0.091
Primary school -0.011 0.005 0.015 0.003 0.009 0.702
Location (L)
Remote school 0.023 0.005 0.000 0.029 0.009 0.001
Rural school 0.015 0.003 0.000 0.012 0.006 0.064
Personal characteristics (Zi)
Diploma -0.003 0.005 0.573 0.069 0.010 0.000
Degree -0.004 0.004 0.317 0.054 0.008 0.000
Higher degree -0.003 0.009 0.765 0.125 0.017 0.000
Science specialist -0.008 0.007 0.238 0.005 0.013 0.670
Arts specialist 0.012 0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.008 0.817
Health specialist 0.002 0.007 0.787 0.014 0.014 0.306
Other specialist 0.008 0.004 0.027 -0.006 0.008 0.467
Disability 0.001 0.005 0.809 -0.020 0.011 0.063
NESB - Asian -0.001 0.009 0.899 0.006 0.017 0.738
NESB - European -0.010 0.007 0.157 0.017 0.012 0.158
NESB - Other -0.006 0.005 0.262 0.000 0.009 0.997
ATSI -0.019 0.017 0.281 -0.060 0.028 0.032
Constant 0.067 0.035 0.055 0.227 0.071 0.001





Table 6: The determinants of teacher turnover and teacher mobility - permanent
workers, males13
Variable Teacher turnover (j = 2) Teacher mobility (j = 3)
Marginal e¤ect s.e. Prob value Marginal e¤ect s.e. Prob value
Pecuniary e¤ects (Wi)
Predicted outside wage 0.021 0.010 0.028 -0.025 0.017 0.131
Own wage -0.077 0.015 0.000 -0.064 0.026 0.014
Locality allowance -0.008 0.005 0.077 0.009 0.004 0.034
Non-pecuniary e¤ects (Xi)
Part time 0.061 0.005 0.000 0.121 0.010 0.000
High student performance -0.003 0.005 0.574 -0.010 0.008 0.246
Low student performance 0.014 0.005 0.003 0.015 0.009 0.076
(ln)School size 0.007 0.005 0.131 -0.049 0.006 0.000
(ln)Average class size -0.008 0.005 0.111 0.049 0.007 0.000
%Female sta¤ 0.011 0.027 0.669 0.069 0.040 0.086
% of sta¤ with degree -0.047 0.025 0.064 0.112 0.035 0.002
No. of private schools -0.001 0.001 0.304 -0.002 0.001 0.213
Local unemployment rate 0.017 0.046 0.708 -0.254 0.084 0.002
Primary school -0.018 0.008 0.030 0.006 0.012 0.623
Location (L)
Remote school 0.009 0.009 0.324 0.053 0.013 0.000
Rural school 0.005 0.006 0.409 0.012 0.010 0.211
Personal characteristics (Zi)
Diploma -0.013 0.006 0.040 0.035 0.012 0.004
Degree -0.018 0.006 0.002 0.033 0.010 0.002
Higher degree -0.012 0.010 0.253 0.073 0.017 0.000
Science specialist 0.006 0.006 0.269 -0.002 0.012 0.886
Arts specialist 0.014 0.006 0.029 -0.004 0.013 0.759
Health specialist 0.001 0.008 0.949 0.022 0.013 0.084
Other specialist 0.011 0.007 0.075 -0.004 0.013 0.746
Disability -0.003 0.007 0.687 -0.020 0.013 0.121
NESB - Asian -0.011 0.014 0.461 0.027 0.023 0.238
NESB - European -0.031 0.015 0.040 0.008 0.020 0.692
NESB - Other 0.002 0.008 0.761 0.019 0.013 0.156
ATSI 0.005 0.017 0.789 0.024 0.028 0.382
Constant 0.101 0.053 0.053 0.128 0.086 0.134





Table 7: The determinants of teacher turnover and teacher mobility - temporary
teachers (males and females)15
Variable Teacher turnover (j = 2) Teacher mobility (j = 3)
Marginal e¤ect s.e. Prob value Marginal e¤ect s.e. Prob value
Male 0.062 0.025 0.012 -0.020 0.023 0.372
Pecuniary e¤ects (Wi)
Predicted outside wage 0.001 0.051 0.987 0.046 0.047 0.326
Own wage -0.024 0.065 0.715 -0.055 0.057 0.340
Locality allowance -0.094 0.031 0.002 0.004 0.022 0.855
Non-pecuniary e¤ects (Xi)
Part time 0.044 0.022 0.045 -0.053 0.020 0.008
High student performance 0.026 0.022 0.246 -0.028 0.020 0.159
Low student performance 0.003 0.026 0.913 -0.004 0.023 0.860
(ln)School size 0.014 0.019 0.474 -0.035 0.016 0.030
(ln)Average class size -0.029 0.023 0.204 0.047 0.020 0.020
No. of private schools 0.002 0.004 0.743 -0.002 0.004 0.597
Local unemployment rate 0.005 0.248 0.983 -0.091 0.217 0.675
Primary school -0.077 0.027 0.004 -0.015 0.024 0.526
Location (L)
Remote school 0.106 0.046 0.021 -0.043 0.043 0.318
Rural school 0.023 0.033 0.486 0.006 0.028 0.834
Personal characteristics (Zi)
Diploma 0.090 0.031 0.003 0.027 0.027 0.312
Degree 0.072 0.024 0.003 0.028 0.021 0.185
Higher degree 0.210 0.052 0.000 -0.021 0.050 0.669
Science specialist 0.093 0.043 0.030 -0.053 0.042 0.203
Arts specialist -0.009 0.031 0.781 0.005 0.027 0.866
Health specialist -0.049 0.045 0.274 0.031 0.038 0.421
Other specialist 0.048 0.030 0.107 -0.019 0.027 0.487
Disability 0.027 0.059 0.650 -0.009 0.054 0.866
NESB - Asian -0.234 0.065 0.000 0.084 0.048 0.077
NESB - European -0.090 0.052 0.084 0.067 0.041 0.098
NESB - Other -0.111 0.058 0.057 0.075 0.044 0.092
ATSI -0.039 0.111 0.722 -0.026 0.096 0.787
Constant 0.040 0.229 0.860 0.096 0.204 0.637









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: The direction of mobility - females18
Moved to a school:
Urban area Rural area Remote area
Variable Marg e¤ect s.e. Marg e¤ect s.e. Marg e¤ect s.e.
Origin: remote school 0.142*** 0.021 0.177** 0.065 0.408*** 0.036
Origin: rural school 0.125*** 0.014 0.561*** 0.036 0.163*** 0.022
Locality allowance 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.021 0.033** 0.014
Remote*locality 0.008 0.024 -0.023 0.095 0.050 0.040
Predicted outside wage -0.034 0.034 0.025 0.070 -0.105* 0.057
Own wage 0.007 0.028 -0.198*** 0.056 0.032 0.046
Part time -0.005 0.009 -0.012 0.019 -0.026* 0.016
Temporary 0.002 0.013 -0.056** 0.026 0.002 0.022
High school performance 0.003 0.009 -0.019 0.020 -0.015 0.016
Low school performance -0.004 0.010 -0.023 0.020 -0.022 0.016
(ln) School size 0.010 0.007 -0.024** 0.012 0.009 0.011
(ln) Average class size -0.018** 0.008 0.035** 0.016 -0.004 0.014
%Female sta¤ -0.102** 0.039 -0.149* 0.082 0.022 0.072
% of sta¤ with degree -0.024 0.034 0.007 0.070 -0.086 0.059
No. of private schools 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
Unemployment rate 0.063 0.097 0.297 0.198 0.055 0.163
Primary school 0.052*** 0.015 0.043 0.030 0.021 0.025
Diploma 0.025 0.018 -0.010 0.037 0.064** 0.030
Science specialist 0.010 0.021 -0.004 0.045 0.024 0.034
Arts specialist -0.021 0.016 -0.002 0.028 0.029 0.021
Health specialist 0.023 0.018 -0.025 0.045 0.024 0.033
Other specialist 0.015 0.013 0.006 0.028 -0.020 0.024
Degree 0.022* 0.014 -0.003 0.029 0.056** 0.024
Higher degree 0.058** 0.027 0.024 0.059 0.069 0.049
Disability -0.011 0.021 0.022 0.037 -0.049 0.039
NESB -0.022 0.015 0.022 0.025 -0.045* 0.024
Constant -0.048 0.116 0.425 0.233




Table 11: The direction of mobility - males19
Moved to urban Moved to rural Moved to remote
Variable Marg e¤ect s.e. Marg e¤ect s.e. Marg e¤ect s.e.
Origin: remote school 0.212*** 0.043 0.098 0.153 0.385*** 0.064
Origin: rural school 0.121*** 0.028 0.697*** 0.074 0.176*** 0.044
Locality allowance -0.000 0.011 0.002 0.031 0.023 0.018
Remote*locality -0.075* 0.041 0.313* 0.193 0.167** 0.080
Predicted outside wage -0.041 0.027 -0.152** 0.065 -0.174*** 0.045
Own wage 0.019 0.046 0.150 0.111 0.130 0.082
Part time 0.014 0.020 0.072* 0.043 -0.032 0.038
Temporary -0.040 0.030 0.031 0.055 -0.009 0.040
High school performance -0.001 0.018 0.072* 0.039 -0.019 0.032
Low school performance 0.045** 0.016 0.039 0.038 0.046* 0.027
(ln) School size -0.017* 0.010 -0.046* 0.025 0.037** 0.020
(ln) Average class size -0.002 0.010 0.026 0.028 -0.050** 0.023
%Female sta¤ -0.086 0.068 -0.424** 0.178 -0.066 0.136
% of sta¤ with degree -0.057 0.058 0.146 0.158 0.087 0.114
No. of private schools 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004
Unemployment rate 0.099 0.156 0.844** 0.354 0.653** 0.257
Primary school 0.040* 0.024 0.091 0.057 0.060 0.043
Diploma 0.072** 0.026 0.126** 0.056 0.022 0.042
Science specialist -0.029 0.025 -0.092 0.061 -0.092** 0.048
Arts specialist -0.054 0.035 -0.126* 0.069 -0.050 0.047
Health specialist 0.003 0.023 0.037 0.053 -0.049 0.044
Other specialist -0.039 0.029 -0.066 0.059 0.032 0.041
Degree 0.063** 0.023 0.089* 0.047 0.064* 0.034
Higher degree 0.057* 0.036 0.142* 0.075 -0.001 0.061
Disability 0.030 0.022 -0.053 0.063 -0.044 0.056
NESB -0.004 0.021 -0.020 0.051 -0.012 0.039
Constant -0.049 0.151 -0.153 0.368
No. of observations 1326
Log Likelihood -613.23
Chi-square(81) 190.71
43
